Publications

  • Marsili, N., & Wiegmann, A. (in press). Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion. Cognition. https://psyarxiv.com/cs45j/
  • Koch, S. & Wiegmann, A. (in press). Folk intuitions about reference change and the causal theory of reference. Ergo. Preprint: https://psyarxiv.com/v8z3d
  • Horvath, J. & Wiegmann, A. (in press). Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgements. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
  • Wiegmann, A. & Sauer, H. (in press). The psychology and rationality of moral judgment. In G. Spohn & M. Knauf (Eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press. Preprint: https://psyarxiv.com/jsdvy
  • Viebahn, E., Wiegmann, A., Engelmann, N., & Willemsen, P. (in press). Can a question be a lie? Ergo. Preprint: https://osf.io/jfyn8/.
  • Wiegmann, A. & Engelmann, N. (in press). Neuere Entwicklungen in der Moralpsychologie. In: N. Paulo & C. Bubiltz (Eds.), Empirische Ethik. Suhrkamp.
  • Horvath, J. & Koch, S. (2021). Experimental philosophy and the method of cases. Philosophy Compass 16(1) e12716.
  • Reins, L. M., & Wiegmann, A. (2021). Is lying bound to commitment? Empirically investigating deceptive presuppositions, implicatures, and actions. Cognitive Science, 45(2), e12936. https://psyarxiv.com/vb67q/
  • Koch, S. (2020). There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch. Philosophical Studies, online-first. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01546-4 
  • Koch, S. (2020). Engineering what? On concepts in conceptual engineering. Synthese, online-first. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02868-w
  • Wiegmann, A., & Rutschmann, R. (2020). Intending to deceive versus deceiving intentionally in indifferent lies. Philosophical Psychology, 33(5), 752-756.
  • Horvath, J. & Nado, J. (2020). Knowledge and normality. Synthese, online-first. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02823-9
  • Prochownik, K., Krebs, M., Wiegmann, A., & Horvath, J. (2020). Not as Bad as Painted? Legal Expertise, Intentionality Ascription, and Outcome Effects Revisited. In S. Denison, M. Mack, Y. Xu, & B. C. Armstrong (Eds.), Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1930–1936). Cognitive Science Society. https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/cogsci20/papers/0437/0437.pdf
  • Horvath, J. (2020). Understanding as a Source of Justification. Mind 129(514), 509–534. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz083
  • Wiegmann, A., Horvath, J., & Meyer, K. (2020). Intuitive Expertise and Irrelevant Options. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, 3 275–310. Preprint at: https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ytqna
  • Wiegmann, A., & Meibauer, J. (2019). The folk concept of lying. Philosophy Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12620 
  • Fischer, E., Engelhardt, P. E., Horvath, J., & Ohtani, H. (2019). Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02081-4
  • Koch, S. (2019). Carnapian explications, experimental philosophy, and fruitful concepts. Inquiry, 0(0), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1567381
  • Koch, S. (2019). Herman Cappelen. Fixing Language. An Essay on Conceptual Engineering (review). Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02201016 
  • Koch, S. (2018). The externalist challenge to conceptual engineering. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02007-6